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1.

INTRODUCTION

Several fundamental flaws exist in the State's argunlent on appeal that further
demonstrate Harris's entitlement to damages and to attorney's fees. First and foremost, the
I

State's attempt to distinguish Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State of Idaho, 132 Idaho 673,
978 P.2d 233 (1999) ("TVC" or "Treasure Valley") is meritless. Not only do the holdings in

Treasure Valley have direct bearing on several issues here, but the position taken by the State in
i
I
I

this case regarding the Mineral Lease is directly contrary to the position it asserted during the
appeal of that case.' Second, contrary to the State's attempts to make it so, this case is not a

i

contractual dispute. No contract claims were made in either the Harris's complaint or the State's
I

counterclaim, and the mere existence of the lease does not shift this case from one based on

I

constitutional rights to one based on contractual rights.

1

Nor do the State's late-stage,

unsupported assertions transform the Mineral Lease into a settlement agreement between the
parties. Third, none of the State's circular reasoning in this case can overcome the fact that title
I

to the property at issue was quieted in Harris. The existence of the Mineral Lease does not
exonerate the State from the repercussions of its violation of constitutional and statutory duties

I

owed to Harris. Moreover, to assert that the State should prevail on this appeal simply because
the District Court found in the State's favor completely ignores the fact that this appeal
challenges the basis of those very rulings. Because those rulings were ill-founded, the State's
appeal is as well. Fourth, the State has not responded to essence of this appeal. Harris has been

Appellants have moved this Court to take judicial notice and/or augment the record in this case to include the
State's Reply Brief filed during the appeal of Treasure Valley. The motion to augment was filed on July 23,2008.
The State's Opening Brief in Treasure Valley was already made part of the record at the initial stages of this lawsuit.
R. Vol. I, pp. 160-190. Harris requests that this Court take judicial notice of these briefs as they bear on Harris's
judicial and collateral estoppel arguments.
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denied his constitutional right to just compensation on the basis that he failed to "go fight city
hall" in response to the State's actions even though the State itself actively misled Harris into
believing there was nothing to "fight city hall" about. Moreover, Harris's claim for damages is

i
~

not stale in light of the fact that the State continued to claim ownership of the disputed property
up to and through the filing of Harris's Complaint. Finally, the clarity of the holdings in TVC,
and the shifting and wholly unsubstantiated positions taken by the State throughout this entire

1

litigation entitles Harris to attorneys fees, both in the lower court and on appeal.

11.

THE STATE IS ESTOPPED, BOTH COLLATERALLY AND
JUDICIALLY, TO ASSERT OWNERSHIP UNDER THE DEED AND
MINERAL LEASE.

TVC disposes of this case under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, leaving for resolution
only the issue of the amount of Hanis's damages. See Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 885,
173 P.3d 1141, 1144 (2007). Additionally, judicial admissions were made by the State in the
I
I

briefs filed in TVC which conflict with the State's version of pivotal facts in this appeal. The
State's strained distinctions between this case and TVC are unconvincing and unsupported by the
record. In light of the foregoing, attorney's fees should be awarded to Harris for both the
proceedings in district court as well as in this appeal.

A.

The State Is Collaterally Estopped.

The State asks this Court to ignore TVC, arguing that it is not applicable and that
reference to it is "simply an attempt to cloud the issues in the case at hand."2 The State claims
that this case is distinguishable because this case involves the settlement of a dispute by contract:
"the parties' dispute centered on the proper interpretation of the 1949 land sale certificate and the
Respondents' Brief at p. I .
I

-
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1971 deed, and it was resolved through.. . entry into another contract, the mineral lease, with the
controversy's ultimate resolution predicated on this court's constn~ctionof the statute, Idaho
Code $47-701, whose requirement were incorporated by reference into the sale certificate and
deed. The parties' relationship, in sum, arose from and was governed throughout by their
contractual

undertaking^."^

This case is distinguishable, the State claims, because the

discrepancy in the reservation language between the certificate of land sale and deed created a
"dispute" which caused Harris and the State to specifically negotiate the mineral lease which
"explicitly authorize[ed] the alleged "taking."4
Because this Court in TVC already considered the historical purpose and use of the State's
mineral leases to the ownership question, collateral estoppel bars the State from relitigating this
issue. In TVC, the State insisted that its "pattern of leasing" mineral rights back to landowners
was to be understood as a reflection of State-ownership under I.C. 47-701. Further, it claimed
that Treasure Valley's signing of the lease further confirmed the State's "settled expectations" in
ownership of sand and gravel on former endowment lands. The State apprised the Court that if it
found that the States' "pattern of leasing" and "settled expectations" were not backed by the
statute, then "any active mineral leases would be in~alidated."~This Court ruled against the
State in TVC, however, and now the State attempts to invert the issue of the role of mineral
leases in the broader issue of ownership, casting the mineral leases as determinative, rather than
dependent on I.C. 47-701. More specifically, it argues now that Harris's mineral lease was a
negotiated settlement document, intended to put to rest by contract the question of ownership,
Respondents' Brief. at p. 6.
Respondents' Brief at p. 1 1.
5
TVC State's Reply at p. 2 (see footnote 1).
4
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rather than a unilateral, boiler-plate, administrative procedure, routinely exercised consistent
with its role as owner as it argued in TVC. This attempt to re-litigate the judicially-settled issue
of ownership under I.C. 47-701 is properly barred by collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel may be applied to prior judgments, estopping a person &om arguing a
finding or verdict that has already been rendered. Navarro v. Yonkers, 173 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Id.
2007); Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 183, 731 P.2d 171, 177 (1986). The
doctrine applies when: (I) the party had a M l and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (2) the
issue decided in the previous litigation is identical to the current issue presented; (3) the issue
was actually decided in the previous litigation and whether the issue was necessary to the prior
judgment; (4) the final judgment was on the merits; and (5) the party who the judgment is
asserted against was a party or in privity with the party to the prior judgment. Navarro, 173 P.3d
at 1144.
Here, as will be more fully demonstrated below, elements (I) and (2) are met, because the
State had a full and fair opportunity in TVC to argue the precise issue in this case, i.e. whether
the purchase documents and signed mineral leases were determinative of State-ownership,
irrespective of 1.C. 5 47-701. In TVC, the State insisted that the mineral lease was based upon

I.C. $47-701 and therefore a ruling on "minerals" under the statute was dispositive of ownership
under the lease. Element (3) is met because the State itself framed the issue and factual basis of
the appeal in TVC in such a way that the question of whether individual deeds and mineral leases
which reserved sand and gravel pursuant to LC.

5

47-701 could nevertheless be interpreted to

give the State ownership rights in the sand and gravel was answered in TVC. The Couri
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ultimately decided that the statute on which the State claimed it based the certificate of land sale,
deed, and mineral lease documents did not include sand and gravel as a reserved mineral and
therefore specific deeds or active mineral leases which attempted to reserve sand and gravel on
the basis of the statute were, as the State had suggested, necessarily invalid. Finally, elements

(4) and (5) apply as the final judgment was on the merits and the State was a party in TVC.
Moreover, the State admits in this lawsuit a striking concession of the point: "the controversy's
I

ultimate resolution predicated on this court's construction of the statute, Idaho Code $47-701,
whose requirement were incorporated by reference into the sale certificate and deed."6
Therefore, the State's attempt to change the meaning of its mineral leases and to avoid the
holding in TVC should be estopped in this case. The focus of this appeal should be the issue of
damages and restitution resulting from the State's inverse condemnation of Harris's land.

I

B.

The State Should Be Judicially Estopped From Chanpin~Its Position on the
Facts.

-

In addition to the fact that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should apply with respect to
the holdings of TVC to the case at bar, another type of estoppel should be applied as well. The
State should be judicially estopped from taking such a contradictory position in these two cases.
Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the Court may prevent such a blatant and unjustified
recasting of the State's position from one proceeding to the next. Idaho case law demonstrates
that this Court has seen fit to exercise this equitable remedy in order to "prevent abuse of the
judicial process by deliberate shifting of positions to suit the exigencies of a particular action."

Respondents' Brief at p. 6
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Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2008) (citing McKay v. Owens, 130
Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1227 (1997)). Because the State's inorphed position regarding
the historical use and purpose of its mineral leases can not be reasonably accounted for by
anything other than a last-ditch effort to escape repaying royalties under TVC, we ask the Court
I

to judicially estop the State from asserting its contract claim.
The adoption of the doctrine of judicial estoppel was announced by this Court in the

1

landmark case, Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87,277 P.2d 561 (1954):
It is quite generally held that where a litigant, by means of such sworn
statements, obtains a judgment, advantage or consideration from one
party, he will not thereafter, by repudiating such allegations and by means
of inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony, be permitted to
obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same
transaction or subject matter.

I

I

Loomis, 76 Idaho 87, 93-94, 277 P.2d 561, 565 (emphasis added). "Essentially, this
doctrine prevents a party from assuming a position in one proceeding and then taking an
inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding .... The doctrine is also intended to

prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the courts." Robertson Supply, Inc. v
Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, 101,952 P.2d 914,916 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added).
Indeed, it is the need to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings and discourage "fast
and loose" lawyering, not a strict list of conditions, that should inform the Court's application of
I

judicial estoppel. See Heinze, 145 Idaho at 240, 178 P.3d at 605 (applying judicial estoppel but
emphasizing that "the circumstances under which [it] may appropriately be invoked are probably
not reducible to any general formulation of principle"). The policy reasons for the doctrine
resound here, as the State, in the last leg of this litigation, attempts to nullify the implications of
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TVC by recasting its position to support a contract theory.
Although this Court has emphasized the uniqueness of each application of judicial
estoppel, it is still instructive to consider the facts of precedential Idaho cases. Keller v. Rogstad,
112 Idaho 484, 733 P.2d 705 (1987), dealt with the question of ownership of a parcel of land
which had been the subject of a series of contradictory deeds. Id. at 486. In Keller, the son of
the property owner took inconsistent positions in two lawsuits involving the same parcel of land.
Comparing the son's position in the first proceeding with that of the latter, the Idaho Supreme
Court found that the son's positions were contradictory. Id. The Court, estopping the son's latter
claim to ownership and ruled that the son was bound by his first set of judicial declarations. Id.
As a result, the Court found that the ownership was determined by the parties' positions in the
previous quiet title proceeding. Id.
Keller provides useful guidance in this matter. First, the Court in Keller applied judicial
estoppel where it appeared that a party was playing "fast and loose" from proceeding to
proceeding, though the land deeds at issue were the same. Second, judicial estoppel reinforced
the integrity of the first proceeding, refusing to allow the second proceeding to essentially nullify
the implications of the first. Third, Keller suggests that for the purposes of judicial estoppel,
inconsistent positions can include contradictory statements regarding the purpose and effect of
land deeds.
Keller applies here. In TVC, the State contended that all land sale certificates, deeds and
mineral leases were based upon LC. § 47-701 and, therefore, statutory interpretation governed
the outcome of the question of ownership of sand and gravel on all former state endowment
lands. To substantiate its argument, the State suggested in TVC that this Court should focus on
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the State's general"pattern of leasing" sand and gravel on lands formerly owned by the state and
standard administrative procedures. These, the State insisted, not the specifics of the addition or
deletion of the phrase "including sand, gravel and pumice" in the mineral reservation language,
established the State's rights to sand and gravel in formerly state owned endowment land.
In oral argument before Judge McKee, for example, counsel for the State in TVC argued:
Of course, the Court must interpret the language in the deeds and the land sale
certificates but those documents specifically incorporate the Code by reference.
So, we're really talking about statutory interpretation.... we're back at 47 -701
either way you look at it.. .. 7
When the district court ruled against the State, the State appealed, presenting the issue on
appeal as follows: "whether sand and gravel were reserved when state-owned lands were sold."8
c

It further explained, "[elach of the certificates of land sale and deeds for the parcels at issue
incorporate the mineral reservation contained in Idaho Code

5 47-701.. ..

"TVC and IPCO

contend, therefore, that the scope of the mineral reservation by the State should be determined as
a matter of law" and "therefore, the sole question before this Court is the "proper interpretation
of Idaho Code

5

47-701."~ Moreover, the State argued at length on appeal in TVC that the

specific wording of the deeds issued by the State should not be considered evidence of
ownership because the deeds, which varied in reservation language, did not accurately reflect the
State's "intent" with respect to sand and gravel on land sold by the state." In support, the State
pointed out that the mineral reservation language of land sale certificates and deeds had been
changed by the Land Board over time and so "the State's historical treatment of the issue makes
'Appellants' Motion to Augment Clerk's ~ e c o r dfiled
,
April 29,2008 at Transcript on Appeal, p. 17.
TVC Opening Brief in Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State of Idaho, SCt Appeal No. 23955, Filed by
Appellants State of Idaho, et al. (hereinafter "TVC Appellants' Opening Brief'), R. Vol. I, p. 165 (emphasis added).
R. Voi. I p. 170.
10
Id. at pp. 169,173, 182, 183-88, 190; TVC Reply Brief at pp 11,12, 17-20 (see footnote 1).
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it difficult to use the administrative interpretation of Idaho Code Section 47-701 as a determining
factor in this litigation.. . in the end, the historical record is somewhat muddled, and the meaning
of the statute must be gleaned primarily from its wording and its objective rather than the history
of its implementation.""

Attempting to justify this "muddled". state of affairs, the State

explained in TVC that after one landowner complained in 1972 about a deed issued to him with
the inclusion in the reservation of minerals of the phrase "including sand, gravel and pumice"'2
(like the Harris's deed):
the Land Board adopted a policy whereby State deeds were to contain language
identical to the original land sale certificate. However, rather than order
replacement forms for new deeds, the State continued to use the old forms which
contained the phrase "including sand, gravel and pumice". In order to ensure that
the deeds conformed to the certificates of sale, the State Department employees
would simply insert the old forms into a typewriter and strike over the phrase.
This means that many deeds issued after 1972 contained the general mineral
reservation
". followed
-- . ' . . . ' by
-- ; "
... the policy was to
ensure conformity between the certificate of sale and the deed, thereby leaving
open the question of whether sand and gravel were reserved.. .."I3
This method of dealing with the "muddled" process of documenting state land sales, the
State confessed, "was apparently motivated by frugality in avoiding the purchase of a new form
rather than a specific intent to disclaim the State's interest.. ..,914 Therefore, the State suggested
in TVC, this Court should ignore the specific land sale contracts and deeds, and look instead to
"[tlhe history of the Department's mineral leases [which] also supports the State's position" that
sand and gravel were reserved under the authority of I. C. 47-701.

l5

The State claimed its

"pattern ofleasing" sand and gravel back to owners of former endowment lands established the
Id. at p.184.
id. at p. 186.
13
Id.at p. 187.
l4 id. at p.188.
I'

l5

TVC Reply Brief at p. 17.
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State's long-held administrative practice of asserting ownership on previously sold lands.16 he
State also argued that Treasure Valley's signing of a lease proved its recognition of State
I

I

ownership of sand and gravel:
The State has entered into numerous leases for sand and gravel mining
on former endowment lands. Some of these leases date back several
decades and are still in effect.17 The basis for these leases is the mineral
reservation in Idaho Code Section 47-701, as incorporated into the
certificates of sale and deeds. 18

I

I

The State referenced the fact that mineral leases were in effect both on land where State
deeds specifically mentioned sand and gravel as included within I.C.

5

47-701 (Harris's

I

situation) and where the deed and certificate did not specifically mention them or the language
had been struck through (both of the latter were the type of deeds in the TVC case.)I9 In any of

I

the three situations, the State argued, the language of the particular deed or certificate was not
important to the determination of ownership.20

I

The State further conceded in TVC that the State was aware of the inconsistencies it had
created, correcting some deeds but not others, and "leaving open" the issue and using old forms
and modifying them in a "catch as catch can" fashion to reserve sand and gravel.21 The State
admitted in TVC that the question of ownership was hotly debated among Land Board members
and in 1984 the Department director, Stanley Hamilton, "suggested that the ownership issue
should be resolved in a declaratory judgment action.'"'

However, the State explained, "the

R. Vol. I pp 169and 188
ld. at p. 182.
idat p. 169.
l9 Id. at p. 185, footnote 9.
"Id. at pp 184-89.
Id at pp. 184-88; TVC Appellants' Reply Brief at p. 15-20 (see footnote 1)
22 TVC Appellants' Reply Brief at p. 16.
l6

l7
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declaratory judgment action was never filed. Perhaps that had to do with the d$ficulty offinding
a party willing to serve as an opposing party. Or, [sic] perhaps the need was alleviated by the

passage of the 1986 amendment to Idaho Code

3 47-701,

which the Department viewed as

confirming its past practice of leasing the minerals. "'j
The State urged a decision in its favor in TVC because "the State also has settled
expectations arising from the fact that is has leased sand and gravel on former endowment lands
for five decades. Any decision for TVC would invalidate active mineral leases and potentially
expose the State to claimsfor payment of back royalties."24

To all of this, and in response to the State's expressed issue on appeal in TVC, this Court
responded in the TVC decision: "prior to the 1986 amendment, the legislature did not intend for
sand, gravel and pumice to be among those minerals reserved by the State when endowment
lands were sold."25 The decision was not limited to the facts of that case; nor was it limited to
whether sand and gravel were included in the pre-1986 list of minerals in I.C. 47-701.2~That the
State understood the application of the TVC opinion to precisely the facts of the present case is
clear from the letter written by the Director of the Department to Harris in November, 1999. In
that letter, Hamilton conceded:
The State issued the lease based on its belief that Idaho Code 347-701
reserved ownership of sand, gravel, basalt and pumice to the state in all sales of
endowment lands. Earlier this year, however, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that
these mineral were not reserved under Idaho Code 547-701 until 1986 and
therefore the state did not own sand, gravel, basalt and pumice on lands covered
by the lea~e.2~
TVC State's Reply at p. 16, foot note 7 (emphasis added).
TVC State's Reply at p. 2 (emphasis added).
25 Trea~ureV d e y Conc~ete
v. State, 132 Idaho 673,677,978 P.2d 233,237 (1999).
26 Respondents' Brief at pp. 13- 14.
R. Vol. lpp. 59-60
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Hamilton explained that pursuant to the court ruling in TVC, the Department "has also
decided to refund all of the rentals and royalties that you have paid to the state over the last five
years. ... the department believes that the refund is appr~priate."~~
A check for a partial refund
was enclosed. No explanation was given in the letter for the partial repayment. By cashing the
check, the payee agreed to release claims against the State related to the lease.
Noteworthy is the fact that in 1999 the Department was not as sure of the strength of
I

Section 27 of the lease as it is now. In this appeal, the State argues that the lease must be
I

enforced-actually,
I

only Section 27 of the lease-because

if the Court doesn't enforce Section

27 as a release and waiver of all claims by Harris, the State will "be disinclined to enter into
releases to settle potential lawsuits for fear that [the other] party could simply proceed with
litigation and recover damages despite the terms of the release."29 If this is, in fact, so, why did
the State send the 1999 letter and check ?
Here, the District Court also ultimately recognized the application of TVC to the present
case. Harris urged strenuously in Plaintiffs' first Motion for Summary Judgment that TVC
disposed ofthis case.30 Harris pointed out, by attaching copies of briefs before the District Court
and this Court, that the State had already argued the significance of the land sale documents to its
ownership claim, the unique nature of the land as federal educational endowment land; the
discrepancies in land sale contract mineral reservation language and deed reservation language,
and the effect of I.C.

5 47-701.

I

28 Id.

29

Respondents' Brief at p. 15.
pp. 8-10; 18-28; 3 1-39; 55-73.

30 T R at

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 12

The State admitted these points at the very commencement of

this lawsuit:
The State's argument is very simple here: The state [sic] asserts that the deed
issued in 1971 to the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs reserved title to sand
and gravel by adding the specific language, including sand and gravel, to the
mineral reservation.... That is the essence of the case is that document,
interpretation of that deed.. .. .Now, there's a few key facts I want the Court to be
aware of, number one, the State acquired these lands in 1890 pursuant to the
United States' grants as I've cited in my brief. These are public school
endowment lands. The lands--sale of these lands and the income from these
leases goes to the public schools fund to support public schools in the State of
Idaho.... it's undisputed the land was sold in 1949...with a general mineral
reservation that just refers to 47-701. The deed in 1971.. .contains the specific
language typed in on a pre-printed form, including sand and gravel, ... and the
State leased this property [to Harris] for a period of years and arguably the lease is
still in effect. ... .We believe that this issue involves a simple interpretation of
law."31
This is further borne out by the State's Counterclaim in this case: "Pursuant to the mineral
reservations set forth in [the Land Sale Certificate and the Deed] ....the State owns all minerals,
including sand and gravel, in the lands described..."32 and the State's Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for Summary Judgment in this case where it
addressed why the additional language was put into the deed form: "As a general rule, an
instnunent should be interpreted in accordance with the commonly understood everyday
meaning of the words. (Citations omitted.) "Include" means "to contain as part of something."
(Citation omitted.) The Land Board obviously intended sand and gravel to be contained as

part of the mineral re~ewation."~~
Finally, the District 'Court ruled on the application of Treasure Valley Concrete as
follows:
TR,at pp. 11-12.
R. Vo1. 1 p. 77.
33 R. Vo1. I1 p. 304 (emphasis added).
3'

32
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I

il
I

The Treasure Valley case, I think, clearly tells me that mineral at the time the
deed was drafted did not include sand and gravel and, therefore, on the issue of
quieting title, I'm quieting title in favor the Harrises.. . the drafter of the deed used
a coma as opposed to a semi-colon and attempted to rely on the mineral grant
afforded the Land Board and therefore I am granting summary judgment on
behalf of the Harrises with respect to quiet title.34

I

1

In spite of all of the above, however, the State denies the application of TVC to this case.

i

and contradicts its own representations in TVC concerning the purpose, preparation, and use of

I
1
i

I

1

I

the land sale contracts, deeds and mineral leases. It asserts here instead that the inconsistency it
created in its deed preparation process created a void which the Mineral Lease filled. Though
the State never disclosed to Harris any of the controversy, inconsistency, disagreement, or lost
lawsuits at the State level, and, in fact, misled Harris to the contrary, the State urges here "but the
issue of title also was the precise reason the parties entered into negotiations which were
ultimately resolved with the mineral lease."35 "Indeed, the parties resolved their contract dispute
without the need for judicial intervention through entry into the mineral lease and the $5,000
royalty payment for past sand and gravel sales."36
Taking great liberties with the evidence in this case, and avoiding their admissions in

TVC, the State has recast the facts to support its claim that Harris abandoned their takings claim
when he signed the Mineral

The State asks this Court to uphold the lower court based

on these stretches of the record as follows:
o The State suggest that Mr. Paul Keeton's visit with Linda Lou Johnson was a
settlement negotiation between the State and Harris's attorney:' rather than a visit
as a friend and legislator to obtain an explanation of the State's demands. This
" TR. at p.45.
" Respondents'
" Respondents'

I

Briefat p. 20.
Brief at p. 9.
37 Respondents' Brief at p. 7.
38 Respondents' Brief at pp. 2-3,6 and p. 15
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suggestion is made throughout the State's brief, in spite of the fact that it has
repeatedly been pointed out to the State that the only evidence in this lawsuit is
directly to the contrary: Keelon's testimony is that he never served as Harris'
and never gave any legal advice to Harris. He merely served to convey
Linda Lou Johnson's message.
o We are also asked to believe that Ms. Johnson's statements (all of which the State

admits were made) were not threats but, euphemistically, k recommendation^"^^
and "advice to the S. Latah Highway District not to purchase those items [sand
and gravel] from the Harrises because of the ownership dispute."40 Moreover, her
demand letters threatening a lawsuit for trespass were actually, according to the
State, simply "the State's indication of its willingness to initiate its own quiet title
actionn4'; and her one-way discourse on the certainty of state mineral law, Land
Board policy, and the consequences to those who do not adhere to the State's
demands is now referred to by the State as "negotiations leading up to the
execution of the lease."42 And even though the only evidence is that Harris signed
the lease for fear the State would execute on its threats, the State asserts that
"[tlhere were no 'high pressure tactics' in place here.... Nor was there any
coercion.. ..,743

o The discrepancy in the State-prepared mineral reservation in Wilken's land sale
certificate and the Estate of Riley's deed-which was previously described by the
State in TVC as "further illustrat[ing] the difficulty in discerning any coherent
State poli~y"44-is now identified by the State as "the existence of a debatable
question of law"45 and the framework of "their contract dispute."46 Similarly, the
actions taken by the State concluding in the signing of the Mineral Leases were
not "general leasing practice of the State" based on LC. 5 47-701 which occurred
routinely, regardless of the nature of the deed and land sale certificate as argued in
TVC, 47 but rather, 'settlement discussions' specifically "tailored to resolution of
the precise dispute at hand."48

Perhaps most critical to the State's case is its contention that the Mineral Lease arose out

Respondents' Brief at p. 3.
Respondents' Brief at p. 10.
Respondents' Brief at p. 19.
42 Respondents' Brief at p. 18.
Respondents' Brief at p. 21.
44
TVCAppellants' Reply and Cross Respondents Brief at p. 15 (see footnote 1).
45
Respondents' Brief at p. 13.
46 Respondents' Brief. at p. 9.
47
R. Vol. I pp 184-86 and 188; TVC Appellants' Reply at pp 12, 17-18.
48
Respondents' Brief at pp 10-1 1 and seep. 21
j9
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of "an unresolved legal dispute" with Harris which entailed "negotiations ... over several
months ...which the parties chose to settle through the mineral lease."49 In TVC, the State
maintained that Mineral Leases were required by the State pursuant to I.C.
I

5 47-701 as part of

the Department's standard land sale "package":
The Idaho Department of Lands has in the past and continues to assert, that sand
and gravel are reserved to the State. This intent is evidenced by the fact that, even
after 1972, the State continued to enter into mineral leases for sand and gravel
mining on former endowment lands pursuant to the general mineral reser~ation.~'
Here, in a rather oxymoronic fashion, the State insists that Mineral Lease served as a settlement

I
I
I

agreement: "The Harrises resolved the dispute by entering into a standard ten-year mineral lease
effective April 1, 1986."~' And, though the State acknowledges the lease was a "standard
mineral lease," it contends: "[tlhe State and the Harrises had a dispute over title, they chose to

1

i

resolve it by entering into the mineral lease.. ."52 and "it is precisely the risk of uncertainty in
litigation which prompted the parties to enter into the mineral lease and to include Section 27."53
Of course, the State provides no citation to evidence in the record to support its representations

I

that a "dispute" existed, much less evidence that negotiations, settlement discussions, or even
discussion of any of the specific terms of the Mineral Lease ever occurred.
A "dispute" is defined as "an assertion of right, claim or demand on one side, met by
contrary claims or allegations on the other,"54 a "clash of opinions".55 Here, the record shows
that the only evidence of a "dispute" was among and between the various Department of Lands

" Respondents' Brief p. 21.
50

R. Vo. I p. 188

'' Respondents' Brief at p. 4.

Respondents' Brief at p. 16.
Respondents' Brief at p. 13.
54
lack's Law Dictionary 558 (4th Ed. 1968).
" Burton, William C., Legal Thesaurus 180-81 (Regular Ed. 1980)
52

53
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Bureaus (Lands Bureau and Minerals Bureau), the Land Board itself and the Department, and the
various attorney general opinions.56 What occurred between the State and Harris were demands,
misrepresentations, threats on the State's side, and submission, as a matter of compulsion, on the
part of ~ a r r i s . ' ~
As for Section 27, without a single reference to the record and in spite of the fact that all
of the evidence is entirely to the contrary, the State asserts that it too was the product of
I

negotiations: "The purpose of Section 27 was to resolve and provide each party with certain

i

assurances concerning title to the subject sand and gravel."58 The truth is that there were no

i

discussions whatsoever concerning Section 27. It was not part of "months of negotiations",s9 hut
rather a disingenuous "CYA" measure tucked into the "fine print" at the back of a State form:

~

I

"the State needed assurance that it would not be sued for damages due to the uncertainty as to the
definition of "mineral" in Idaho Code 5 47-701 and the effect of the reservation in the deed."60

I

I

What should be abundantly clear at this point is that the State is repudiating the
averments it made in TVC with inconsistent and contrary allegations in this case in order to
achieve a different outcome from TVC. The State should not be allowed to proceed with its
newly-adopted position that Harris's Mineral Lease was a specially negotiated settlement offer,
intended to contractually resolve any dispute over ownership of the sand and gravel. As argued
at length above, this is inconsistent with the State's assertions throughout both the TVC
proceedings and the early stages of this case. To allow the State to shift the legal issue before the

s6 Appellants'

I

Opening Brief, pp 5-8 and see footnote 36, supra.
Appellants' Opening Brief, pp 10-1 1 and 34-36.
Respondents' Brief at p. 22.
59Respondents'Brief at p. 20.
Respondents' Brief at p. 22.
57
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Court, based upon these inconsistencies, would threaten the integrity of the TVC proceeding, and
condone the State's "fast and loose" approach to advocacy.
111.

A.

THE FACTS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE THIS CASE ARE THAT
HARRIS OWNED THE SAND AND GRAVEL AND THE STATE
EXCERCISED CONTROL OVER THEM. THEREFORE HARRIS IS
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES.
The District Court Has Already Decided There Was A "Talunp".

The issue of whether a taking occurred is not properly before this Court as the District
Court's judgment is based upon a governmental taking having occurred, but neither damages or
equitable relief was awarded to Harris because, in the District Court's view, Section 27 of the
Mineral Lease must be enforced against Harris. The State did not appeal that portion of the
judgment which assumes a "taking."
The District Court broke its judgment "to preclude recovery on their inverse
condemnation claimn6' into two sections. Section A's holding was summarized as: "Paragraph

27 of the mineral lease precludes recovery the Harrises for the period of the Lease." Section B's
holding was summarized as: "The applicable statute of limitations precludes recovery by the
Harrises for the period of the lease."62 The District Court stated its conclusion as: "The Hanises
are precluded from recovery on their inverse condemnation claim because the lease period is
governed by the express terms of the lease, which explicitly limit all liability of the State, and the
pre-lease period is outside the statute of lirnitation~."~~

In its analysis on Section B, the court stated that "[tlhis case is analogous to McCuskey v.

R. Vol. IV p.1112.
R. VOI. IV pp 1 109-10 (emphasis added)
63 Id. at 1112 (emphasis added).
6L
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Canyon County Commissioners (citation omitted) and Intermountain West, Inc. v Boise City
(citation omitted)--both takings cases--because in this case, as in those, "the Harrises were given
an ultimatum just as the parties in McCuskey and Intermountain were given stop work notices."
With respect to the date of the taking, those cases measured it as follows: "the actual date of
taking is fixed at a point in time in which impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute
a substantial interference with plaintiffs property interest, [sic] became apparent," Tibbs v. City
1

I

of Sandpoini (citation omitted). And in this case, the court found the State asserted title in 1985,
demanded back payments in 1986, and gave Harris the "option" of leasing the sand and gravel

I

rights in 1986. The Court concluded:
"[blased on this rule [Tibbs],applied by the Supreme Court in McCuskey
and Intermountain, the Hanises' date of taking could be as early as
September 1985 or February 1986, the date the parties entered into the
lease. Because the Harris became aware of the full extent of the
government's interference with the use and enjoyment of their property
no later than 1986, the applicable statute of limitations bars their claim
for inverse condemnation before the initial period of the
Therefore, the judgment can only be read to mean that although the State's exercise of
ownership and control over Harris's land in 1985 and 1986 was a "taking", recovevy for that
taking is barred by the statute of limitations and by EIarris's agreement in the Mineral Lease to
assume the risk and liability for the State's wrongful claim, and to waive any loss, damage, and
claim for refund.
Further, the wording used by the court in its judgment supports this conclusion. The
court repeatedly used the word "recovery" and this term has special legal significance.
"Recovery" is defined as "boom (prosperity), compensation, cure, damages, expiation, progress,
" Id
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recompense, redemption, reform, repair, replacement, replevin, restitution, resurgence, revival,
salvage, t r ~ v e r . ~Further,
'
in In re Lahn, 167 NYS 217, 219 (App.Div. 1917), it was defined as
"[tlhe amount finally collected, or the amount of the judgment." In Black's Law Dictionary,
recovery with respect to a plaintiff is "in its most extensive sense, the restoration or vindication
of right existing in a person'' or the "obtaining of some right or property which has been taken or
I

withheld from him." The court' intended use of the word "recovery" to mean that although a
1

I

taking occurred it did not find a basis for an award of damages is further supported by the
District Court's ruling on attorneys fees where it held that the State prevailed "on the defense of

I

the damages component of the case."66 Accordingly, a proper reading of the judgment leads to
i

1
I

the conclusion that the judge found a "taking" but no "recovery" for Harris. No appeal having
been taken from that portion of the judgment the focus of this appeal should be on whether his
decision concerning "recovery" was correct.

!

B.

I

The State's Conduct Did Amount to an Uncom~ensatedTaking.

~ e ~ a r d l e of
s s the wording of the judgment, a taking did occur and to the extent the
District Court's decision does not so provide, it should he reversed. Once Harris's property rights
were established and it was shown that the State claimed those rights for itself, Harris established
the elements of a "taking" by the government entitling him to just compensation. It is irrelevant
how the State attempts to frame its conduct. The United States Constitution provides that
"private property [shall not] he taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const.,
I

amend. V. Idaho's Constitution similarly states that "[plrivate property may be taken for public
Burton, William C., Legal Thesaurus (Regular Ed. 1980).
ellant ant's Motion to Augment Reporter's Transcript datcd April 29,2008. (Transcript of Motion for Attorney
Fees and Costs, p. 14 (emphasis added).
65
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use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be
paid therefore." Id. Const., art. I, § 14. The law in Idaho provides that real property and those
matters appurtenant to it cannot be taken nor materially interfered with by the government
without just compensation. I.C.

5

7-702. When the state appropriates property without going

through the procedure of a condemnation, the property owner may initiate an inverse
condemnation suit and request compensation. See Reisenauer v. State, 120 Idaho 36, 39, 813
P.2d 375, 378 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 220 n. 4, 596 P.2d 75, 92
(1978)); Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 325, 17 P.3d 266,269 (2000).
Here, the District Court ruled that Harris is, and was at all times since they acquired their
fee simple interest in 1980, the owner of the sand and gravel on their farm.67 As such, Harris
was entitled to use his property and the surface and the sand and gravel located on it as he
pleased; removing what he wanted, when he wanted, building and excavating; selling or leasing
whatever he deemed appropriate; and granting or denying access to whomever he pleased,
without a single cent of payment to the State of Idaho and certainly without asking permission or
getting approval from the State. The State's denial of Harris's right to do so and use of the
property for public benefit constituted an unconstitutional taking.
Federal courts have already addressed the specific issue of whether the government's
wrongful assertion of ownership of mineral rights is a "taking" if based upon a good faith belief
that the rights belonged to the government. The decisions are consistently that where the
government's claims deprive the true owner of full ownership and occupation, the government
must pay damages for the period of claimed ownership. Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. US.,
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821 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1987)~' Even more to the point, federal courts have ruled that it is a
"taking" if the government claims ownership over a substance whose nature as mineral or nonmineral is debated and then denies access to that substance to its rightful owner. Foster v. US.,
607 F.2d 943 (Ct CL. 1979)
In Foster, the owner of mineral rights on land acquired by the government was denied
access to the dolomite because the government did not consider dolomite to be "minerals" within
Foster's mineral reservation. Dolomite was later determined to be a mineral and thus Foster's
property. By withholding from Foster the right to access the dolomite, the federal court held that
"the Government here has taken plaintiffs' mineral rights by withholding access to the deposits."

Foster v. United States, 607 F.2d 943 Ct. C1. 1979) Moreover, the fact that Foster knew the
government claimed ownership of the dolomite before he acquired his interest in the dolomite
had no bearing on the court's analysis that a "taking" had occurred. The focus is on the
government's acts when reviewing facts for inverse condemnation. Foster, citing 287 Corporate

Center Assoc. v. Township ofBridgewater, 101 F. 3d 320,324 ( 1996).
Foster and Yuba are persuasive authority in this case.69 Five years after Harris bought the
Forty Acres and began removing sand and gravel from it, the Slate, claiming itself the exclusive

''What happened in this case was that the United States prohibited Yuha from exercising its mineral rights by letter dated April
9, 1976, explaining that it thought that the mineral rights belonged to the United States and not to Yuba. Afier losing the quiet
title action brought by Yuba, the United States retracted its letter of prohibition and Yuba was again free to mine after nearly a
six-year interval. The government's withdrawal of its prohibition of Yuba's mining activities worked "an alteration in the
property interest taken-from [one ofJfull ownership to one of temporary use and occupation", in both cases a"taking" for which
the plaintiff must he compensated." Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 821 F.2d 638,641 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
68

69 These arguments and authority were argued to the District Court at Plaintiffs' Response to State's Third Motion

for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof: R. Val. V at pp. 952-971; Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment on Count Three- Inverse Condemnation and Memorandum in Support Thereof. R. Vol. V at pp.
877-916.

-
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owner of those rights, demanded that Harris discontinue his sand and gravel activities on his land
and threatened to sue him in trespass if he persisted. The State denied Harris access to and
economic use of his sand and gravel. This denial is a physical, compensable "taking".

The

Mineral Lease, like the letters advising ofthe State's purported ownership, the letters demanding
Harris cease his sand and gravel operations, and the State's other claims of ownership, are the
product of and h e means through which the State exercised the "taking". Contrary to the State's
contention, the Mineral Lease is not absolution from the "taking"

after it occurred.

It is not

'evidence that it was a voluntary relinquishment by Harris of his rights. In fact, it is exactly the
opposite, i.e., it is proof of the State's exercise of inverse condemnation.
Pettro v. United States, 47 Fed.Cl. 136 (2000), is on all fours. In that case, the
government unsuccessfully made the same argument. Pettro and his predecessors had been
removing sand and gravel from the pit since 1914, but it was not until 1996 that the government
claimed ownership of the sand and gravel by virtue of a reservation of "minerals" in the
government. The Forest Service issued cease-and-desist orders to Pettro in relation to Pettro's
intermittent sale of sand and gravel to contractors on a royalty basis. The government sent letters
declaring itself the owner under its interpretation of the sale transaction documents, advising
parties under contract with Pettro not to remove sand and gravel because the government claimed
ownership, and threatening punitive action against Pettro if he did not cease and desist from
further action relative to the sand and gravel. Mr. Pettro contested the Forest Service's claim but
did not take any further action with respect to either continued removal of sand and gravel or the
initiation of his own quiet title action. A year later, the government filed a lawsuit to quiet title
in itself. Two years later, after title was quieted in Pettro, Pettro brought an action in inverse
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condemnation for the taking of his property.
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims noted that because title had been quieted in Pettro,
there was no dispute that Pettro had a valid property right; nor was there a question that the
Forest Service's letters constituted governmental action. Id. at 145. The court found that the
Forest Service's letters clearly demonstrated that "[tlhe United States actively attempted to take
plaintiffs property as its own, and, therefore, the Forest Service's actions should be analyzed
under the law applicable to physical takings." Id. at 146. Those letters were much like the
Department's letters in this case and the federal court viewed them as clearly threatening: "The
letter ended with a clear threat: "You and others under your control will be held liable for any
additional removal from this pit. If mining in the pit continues, the Forest Service will take
appropriate measures to protect the United States' interests." Id. at 147.
The Forest Service defended similarly to the State in this case. It argued that its "assertion of
ultimate ownership should be treated differently than an exercise of condemnation." Id at. 149.
The.Forest Service contended its conduct was proprietary; as the state asserts here, between
"contractual partners in a commercial v e n t ~ e " ; ' ~
merely exercising the property right which the
Mineral Lease granted it.7' However, the Pettro court explained why these arguments are not
compelling. In the first place, the government did more than assert its rights or bargain for a
contract; it interfered in business contracts with third parties for the removal of sand and gravel
and did so with threats. Id at 147. And secondly, neither the Forest Service in that case, or the
Department in this case, acted as a private party would. Rather than bring a lawsuit to declare

70 Respondentsi Brief at

7'

p. 7.
Respondents' Brief at p. 10.
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ownership and then collect damages if successful or seek an injunction,
[The government], in contrast, chose neither of these two options, and instead
utilized threats backed by its sovereign power to prevent plaintiff from operating
in the pit. As the Federal Circuit noted in Yuba II, "[tlhe United States is not a
private party. It imposes penalties, criminal and civil, the threat of which lurks
behind government statements like those here involved, regardless of what the
government may have intended. . . . Whether in a property conflict the actions of
the government may be equated with those normal to a private citizen is
determinable only in light of all the facts." 723 F.2d at 889. Based on the record
in this case discussed above, the actions undertaken by the government were not
merely equivalent to those of a private citizen when the government ordered the
plaintiff and his contractors to cease and desist, or in the alternative to face
penalties. Pettro, 47 Fed. C1. at 150 (emphasis added).

Pettro compels the same analysis of the facts in this case. Pettro's voluntarily relinquishment
of his rights by no longer removing sand and gravel for three years while the Forest Service
pursued its quiet title action , was viewed by the Court as the proof of the effectiveness of the
government's inverse condemnation, not as a waiver of his right to compensation. Pettro vacated
his pit because he feared the steps threatened by the Forest Service. Here, the State tendered an
ultimatum to Harris: 'Sign the Mineral Lease or lose your rights to access, control, and payments
from the sale.' ("Your alternatives are to: (1) secure the lease in your name ... as our lessee. ...

(2) The South Latah Highway District can lease the site directly from the state.. .. As lessee, the
Highway District would control the sale of all the material from this site....72) Harris's
uncontroverted affidavit in this case proves that Harris acted out of fear of the State's threats.
Harris did not re-enter his gravel pit but rather signed the Mineral Lease as a result of the State's
ultimatums.73 Moreover, as illustrated, the Pettro court made it clear that this type of
government action is a physical taking, and the State's efforts to differentiate this case from
72

73

See Applellants' Opening Brief at p. 10 citing to R. Vol. 111pp 593-594.
R. Vo1. IV pp. 747-755.
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physical takings cases, are legally insupportable.74
Moreover, even if one were to accept the State's representation that Section 27 of the
lease was specifically negotiated with mineral lessees such as Harris in order to avoid "the
uncertainty in litigation" by "providing each party with certain assurances concerning the title to
the subject sand and gravel":5

the fact of a "taking" in 1985 is not changed. "Once a taking has

occurred, subsequent actions by the government cannot relieve it of the obligation to compensate
a property owner for the period during which the owner's rights were abridged." Pettro, at 47
Fed. C1. at 145, citing Tabb Lakes, Ltd v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800 (Fed.Cir.1993). It is
ludicrous to argue, as the State urges here, that a "taking" is no longer a "taking" if the party on
whom the government exerts its pressure then submits to the government's ultimatums.
Furthermore, as Pettro, Yuba, and Foster instruct, the focus is on the government's actions. The
fact that Harris still "had the right to seek enforcement of the contract reflected in the land sale
certificate or reformation of deed"76 does not change the outcome. Pettro also could have
brought suit against the government but did not out of the same fear and belief of the government
as in this case. Likewise, as in Pettro, the subseauent quieting of title in Harris is dispositive on
the issue of 13arris' property interest in the sand and gravel. Pettro, 47 Fed. C1. at 146. It is not
relevant--even if it were true-that

at the time the State took control it had a good faith belief in

its claim. As Yuba noted:
determination of whether the United States has acted in a proprietary or
governmental-sovereign capacity is of little, if any, use in Fifth Amendment-just

her here fore, since the Harrises' claims do not involve a construction project, or even a direct physical taking,
McCnskey is conl~olling." Respondents' Brief at p. 24
75 Respondents Brief at pp. 13 and 22
"Respondents' Brief at p. 9.
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compensation analysis. The purpose and function of the Amendment being to
secure citizens against govenlrnental expropriation, and to guarantee just
compensation for the property taken, what counts is not what the government said
it was doing, or what it later says its intent was, or whether it may have used the
language of a proprietor. What counts is what the government did. What the
government appears to have done here was to prevent Yuba from mining minerals
for about six years.

Yuba, 723 F.2d at 889-90 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
Ultimately, it is not necessary to delve into the State's intent or purpose. The very fact that the
government failed to bring legal action or appeal the very first district court decision in 1958
holding that the State had no right to sand and gravel under I.C. 4 47-701 77 (the undisputed basis
on which the State asserted ownership in this case), is "evidence that it had not necessarily acted
with the good faith" Id at 888-89; Pettro, 47 Fed. C1. at 150.
C.

The Existence Of The Mineral Lease Does Not Convert Harris's Claim Or
The Remedy To One In Contract.

The State claims that "the parties' relationship, in sum, arose from and was governed
throughout by their contractual undertakings"78 and urges this Court to rule that "[tlhe Mineral
Lease is a Valid and Binding

and "any damage claim arising from the economic

relationship here implicates breach-of-contract, not Fonrleenth Amendment-grounded takings
and just compensation, [sic] principles."80 Yet, the State's own pleadinvs belie that point. The
State's defense to this lawsuit is not that Harris breached the Mineral Lease (the State has never
pled or defended on the basis of breach of contract), nor that the State performed the Mineral
Lease-which clearly it could not do as it was never, in fact, the owner. Nor did the State answer
See Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 5.
Respondents' Brief at p. 6.
79 Respondents' Brief at p. 12.
Respondents' Brief at p. 7.
77

78
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or counterclaim against Harris on the basis that it was acting in a contractual capacity in a
commercial venture with Harris. Also, the State never alleged untimely filing of a contract
claim. Rather, the State's Answer and Counterclaim to this lawsuit (and nearly all of its briefing
and argument ) were based on the State's claim to ownershi~of the real property, to quiet title in
itself,?" -not pursuant to the Mineral Lease -but pursuant only to the certificate of land sale and
deed to Harris's predecessors in interest.82
The State nevertheless urges this Court to ignore the facts of this case and the State's
own pleadings, and find that the competing claims of the parties in this lawsuit are "in
substance" a breach of contract8' and that the terminateds4 contract
only with respect to the exculpatory provisions.86 This

position

(not "was") valids5-but
is

not

only

factually

untenable, but it is legally untenable as well. The State proposes that the government be allowed
to make invalid claims against real properly, which such claims are later to be exonerated by
piecemeal application of contracts entered into as a result of the State's wrongful claim. To
condone the State's argument, is to grant every governmental authority a "free pass" for any
"taking" in which the government has doubts--or

even actual knowledge---of its lack of

ownership rights. What good are eminent domain statutes and one's Fifth Amendment Rights at
that point?
Additionally, contrary to the State's claim that the Mineral Lease represents "voluntary
dealings" between Harris and the State and therefore Harris's damages claim arises out of breach
R. Vol. I pp. 77-78.
R. V01. I pp. 76-77.
83 Respondents' Brief at p. 9.
84 The lease was terminated by the State at the time of Hamilton's 1999 correspondence to Harris. R Vol. I p. 31.
85
Respondents' Brief at p. 12.
86 Respondents' Brief at pp. 13-22.
"
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of contract? the actual situation is that the State forced the lease as part of it assertion of title
under I.C. 5 47-701. The State does not deny that Linda Lou Johnson: 1) misrepresented the
State's rights to ownership, Land Board policy when landowners questioned state ownership, and
the success of past challenges to state ownership; and 2) threatened trespass lawsuits and taking
away the contract with the Latah County. Thus, the State's reliance on Boyce v. Augusta-

Richmond Counly, 111 F.Supp.2d 1363 (S.D.Ga. 2000) is misplaced. None of the cases relied on
by the State involve the issue of compulsion, duress, or misrepresentation of facts and law in the
contracting process or with 'leases- tumed-settlement- agreements.'
Furfhermore, the State's argument that there is no "taking" because Harris always had the
right to sue the State for enforcement of the land sale contract or for reformation of the deed until
he waived such rights by signing the Mineral Lease is also incorrect. It completely ignores the
sole reason Harris did not pursue that course of action, is., because the State's misrepresented
the facts surrounding the State's ownership claim and threatened Harris. As Pettro, supra.,
explained, more is not needed to show a taking.

D.

The Lease Was Not Consent by Harris to the State's Taking.

The State claims that this case is distinguishable from Yuba (discussed above) because
Harris entered into the Mineral Lease "explicating authorizing the alleged "taking."88 Section

27, however, contains no wording which can be understood this way. Section 27 says only that
if the State is 'subsequently divested of said title, no liability shall be incurred by virtue of the
lease for any loss or damage to the Lessee; nor shall any claim for refund ... be made by said

87

Respondents' Brief at pp. 9-10
Respondents' Brief at p. I I .
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Lessee."

First of all, the State was not "subsequently divested" because the State had no

interest in the property to divest at the time the lease was signed. Moreover, Section 27 is
certainly not an explicit authorization by Harris for the State to take its property without right
I

and without compensation, nor is it an explicit waiver of Harris's constitutional rights
E.

The State's Position that the Mineral Lease is a Settlement Agreement is
Unsupported by the State's own Admissions and the Record.

As has been illustrated in depth in preceding sections, the idea of the Mineral Lease as a
specifically-negotiated settlement contract is a recent invention of the State. It is inconsistent

1

with even its own pleadings in this case. In fact, the suggestion did not even arise until the State
moved for reconsideration of the District Court's ruling in Harris's favor on the Inverse
Condemnation claim several years into this lawsuit.90 The State's Answer and Counterclaim
illustrates the position the State took throughout most of this litigation: "The State admits that in

I
I

its letter of Feb. 5, 1986, it informed Plaintiffs of their need for a lease from the State in order to
remove additional sand and gravel from the property that was owned by the State.. .."91 Further,
concerning proof of the existence of this 'mutually agreed up and negotiated lease'-the State
responds only "[tlhe Harrises provide no evidence that the States would not have agreed to adjust
or remove terms in the lease.""

There is NO EVIDENCE that the Mineral Lease, and in

particular Section 27 of the leases, was ever even discussed, much less negotiated as some kind
of settlement agreement. The District Court erred when it decided that in spite of this fact,
Section 27 (but not the entire Mineral Lease) was enforceable against Harris.
89

Respondents' Brief at p. 15.
same at R. Vol. VI pp. 1077 -1082
91 R. Vol. I1 pp 72-73.
92 Respondents' Brief at p. 22.
90 See argument of the
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The Court: But you're suggesting in your submission that the State had an
obligation to determine what rights it had to this property.
Ms. Denton: I think there is case law to that effect, yes.
The Court: and I think paragraph 27 clearly puts that obligation on the Hanises'
shoulders.
Ms. Denton: Your honor, in order to do that there would have to be some
showing that my clients bargained for that, that they understood that and knew
that when they signed the lease.
The Court: I disagree.. .if it's in the lease and it's clear to me, I'm going to apply
it and it's clear to me. 93
The State argues that the reasonableness and legitimacy of its actions are borne out by the
court's findings, such as the one above. However, this ruling, like many others identified in this
appeal, is outside the evidentiary and legal parameters of this case. Because the State has pinned
its appeal to these rulings, its appeal must likewise fail.

IV.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER I.C. 6 5-224 DOES NOT BAR
RECOVERY.

A.

Harris's Claim Is Timely.

The State claims Harris should have brought a quiet title action instead of signing the
Mineral Lease, and that the Mineral Lease initiated the running of the statute of limitations on
Harris's inverse condemnation action. Harris's lawsuit, the State asserts, was brought too late.
In truth, Harris's claims are timely on three grounds: (1) this was a physical taking and
the statute should not run until the last of the acts by the State; (2) the State's conduct prevents it
from raising this defense; and (3) the State's active deception extends the statute until such time
as Harris could have discovered the harmiloss he suffered as a result of the State's
93

TR.at pp. 89-90 (emphasis added).
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misrepresentations.
Concerning the first ground, the State has misunderstood Harris's argument concerning

~

the accrual of Harris's cause of action for inverse condemnation. Harris does not argue that the
I

date on which "all of their damages were fixed to a precise dollar amount" is the appropriate date
for tolling the statute of

limitation^?^

Rather, Harris asserts that the extent and degree of the

State's interference with his rights was conjectural until

the State renounced its claim of

1

ownership of the sand and gravel and terminated the Mineral Lease in November, 1999.

I

Arguably, that date could be extended to as late as May, 2003, when the State filed its
counterclaim once again asserting its ownership. Such action in this case could be viewed, at the
minimum, as a continuing act of invasion of Harris's property rights.95 The evidence in this case

I

is that the State periodically and unilaterally over the years expanded its control and involvement
in Harris's sales of sand and gravel and use of his surface e ~ t a t e ? ~The State on multiple

I

occasions adjusted lease terms and rent and royalty rates threatening lease termination, and

I

conveyance to third parties of the rights to the sand and gravel on the Forty Acres if Harris did
not comply with each new demand. That evidence, coupled with the State renewed claim to
outright ownership in 2003, demonstrates that the State's "taking" was not a "one-time" static
event.
This case is, therefore, unlike McCuskey v. Canyon County Commissioners, 128 Idaho

I

213, 912 P. 2d 100 (1996), for two reasons; (a) this is a physical taking whereas McCuskey is a
9kespondents' Brief at p. 23.
See e.g. Pettro, supra. The Forest Service's letters and its affirmative claim to ownership through its quiet title
action clearly demonstrated to the Pettro coust that "[tlhe United States actively attempted to take plaintiffs
property as its own, and, therefore, the Forest Service's actions should be analyzed under the law applicable to
physical takings." Peltro, 47 Fed. CI. at 146.
9G See examples at Appellants' Opening Brief at pp 11-13.
95
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regulatory taking and Idaho courts have recognized the distinction in analyzing them and the
categorical duty to compensate in the former case even for a temporary taking;7

and (b)

McCuskey involved the county's refusal to allow McCuskey to build and that one act was made

known to McCuskey in the issuance of a stop-work order and the rescission of his building
permit. Conversely, here, both the degree and nature of the State's interference with Harris's
rights varied and were extended over a different amount of property and periods of time. The
Mineral Lease covered forty acres of Harris' properly, but Harris's mining operations had been
conducted on more or less than two acres during the applicable period.98 The lease nevertheless
gave the State authority to exercise its rights as "owner" at any time over the entire forty acres.
Additionally, the lease terms were for ten years each, subject to unilateral termination by the
State. Over the years, the'state exercised some but not all of its rights under the lease; changing
lease terms when it deemed appropriate.
Even the degree of State involvement in Hanis's property rights has varied and was not
stabilized until recently. The State's position on whether it considered itself to have ownership
of the sand and gravel has been settled for the first time, in 2007, when it finally conceded
Harris's ownership.99 The State's last active "taking" conduct was in 2003 when it filed its
counterclaim for ownership of the sand and gravel; and its last exercise of direction and control
over the extraction of sand and gravel were in the form of its management of the lease which
continued until 1999 (different examples of the State's activities from 1989 to 1999 are identified
97 Edward

F. Wroe and Andrew Wright, Inverse Condemnation in Idaho (in the Wake of the Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Case), The Advocate (Nov. 2002), 23.
98 TR. at p. 193.
99 TR. at pp 1 l (2003: "...arguably the lease is still in effect...") and 195 (2007 ...the State cancelled the lease and
relinquished any ownership rights... and plus the court made a decision that there's no interest in sand and gravel.
('That's the law of the case. The Department agrees with that.")
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in the recordio0)with major changes in the State's degree of control identified in new lease
provisions in 1996."' Thus, the earliest possible time the situation stabilized enough for Harris
I

to calculate with some reliability the type and extent of the damages he suffered was November,
1999-when the State quit actively exerting control over the sand and gravel operations and

I

surface estate. At that point Harris, knew which of the Forty Acres were impacted by the State's

I

taking, and knew what type of interest the State had taken, even though Harris could still not
have calculated their damages "to the last centr i,102 because the State still clung to ownership. No
earlier than 1999, at any rate, could Harris's situation have been deemed "complete":
I

Unless the contract and all of the acts to be perfonned pursuant to the
contract have been completed, it would be difficult for the state to
determine the nature or extent of its liability or prepare a defense to any
claim. Furthermore, if parties can present the state with a complete and
definitive claim for damages arising from the continuing tort, then the
state may attempt a settlement on the basis of clearly ascertainable facts.
If we were to adopt a contrary view, settlements would either be based
on pre-completion speculative damages, or would have to await the
completion of the project.

Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398,630 P.2d 685 (1981)
"Where a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely
as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period....The focus
is on the defendant's affirmative acts." 287 Corporate Center Assoc. v. Township of

Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320, 324 (31d Cir. 1996). "In most federal causes of action, when a
defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act

I

evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an instance, the

I

loo
lo'

R Vol. I11 pp 465-548.
See Appellants Opening Brief at pp. 12-13.
Respondents' Brief at p. 26.
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court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred." Brenner v.

Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters &Joiners, 927 F.2d 1283, 1295-1296 (3d Cir. Pa. 1991).
Even where there is no continuing series of acts and "final act" which tolls the statute, the
situation may require the culmination or termination of the government's claim to ownership to
toll the statute. Oro Fino Consolidated Mines, Inc. v. US., 118 Ct.Cl. 18, 21-22, 92 F.Supp.
1016-18 (Ct. C1. 1950) is a case in point. In. Oro Fino, the government closed down the
plaintiffs mine on January 18, 1943. The order was revoked on June 30, 1945. The plaintiff
sought damages for its lost production and cost to secure the mine during the period of wrongful
closure. Oro Fino brought suit on February 8, 1950. The government moved to dismiss on three
grounds, one of which was that the action was barred by the applicable six year statute of
limitations.
The court analyzed the issue of acqmal of the cause of action relying on the precedent of

United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 67 S. Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed 1789 (1947). It agreed with
the government that, unlike the facts in Dickinson, which involved continuous events, the Order
was a single event causing damage. Even so, the applicable date for running of the statute of
limitations was not the date of the Order:
[i]n one respect, there is more reason in the present case than there was in the
Dickinson case for not commencing the statutory period with the Government's
first act. From the time the plans for the Winfield Dam were completed, there
was no doubt what would be taken; what lands would be inundated was a matter
of engineering calculation. The problem there was when. The problem here is
not so much when the taking, if it was a taking, occurred, as what it was,
precisely, what was taken. Until Order Z-208 was revoked, no one could know
exactly what had been taken from the standpoint of compensation. .... I f
defendant took anything, it took a temporal interest, perhaps for one year,
perhapsfor five, perhapsfor more. Under the circumstances, it would be unfair if
the statute had started running against plaintiff at a time when there was no way
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of knowing the duration ofthe interest taken. .... It was held in the Dickinson
case that an aggrieved owner need not bring suit until the consequences of the
taking "have so manifested themselves that a final account may be struck." It was
not finally clear until June 30, 1945, what had been "taken"fromp1aintifl
Oro Fino, 118 Ct. Ci. at 21-22, 92 F. Supp. at 1018 (citations omitted, emphasis added). The court

ruled that the situation was not stabilized so that Oro Fino could determine the degree and type of
property that was taken until afier the government's contro over that property was withdrawn.
Only then could Oro Fino know what actually had been taken.
This same reasoning was applied by this Court in C di G:
It is not unreasonable to require a governmental entity which has violated a
citizen's basic constitutional right to remain subject to suit until the occurrence of
actual loss attributable to its wrongful conduct can be verified and valued.
Adopting the lime of project-completion as the date of accrual of a claim for
inverse condemnation which involves a physical invasion accomplishes this
simple goal.

C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4,139 Idaho 140,148,75 P.3d 194,202 (2003)
(emphasis added).
Though not a construction contract case, the present facts involve the government's
continuing physical invasion of Harris's property rights. Therefore, the date of accrual of the
statue of limitations for Harris's inverse condemnation claim should be the date when the State's
wrongful conduct terminated. Accordingly, under the project completion rule the date of accrual
of Harrises condemnation claim is no earlier than November, 1999.
B.

The State Should Be Estopped From raisin^ The Defense Of The Statute Of
Limitations.

Even if Harris did bring their lawsuit in an untimely manner under I.C. 3 5-224, the State
should be barred by equitable estoppel from raising the defense of the statute of limitations.
Similar to the facts in C&G, the State erroneously asserted that it had property rights over the
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Harris's sand and gravel. Like the plaintiff in C&G, Inc., the Harris believed the Slate when it
claimed ownership of their property under state law; like the landowners in C & G, Inc., Harris
was threatened with lawsuits and misled concerning the State's ownership. This was the sole
reason for delay in both landowners' claims for compensation. In C & G, Inc., Justice Pro Tern
Schwartzman, relying on United States v. Dickinson, supra., emphasized that the onus of
determining when the decisive moment of "taking" occurs, should not he put on the private
landowner. "Certainly, in this case, the Highway District could have fixed the time when the
property was taken by instituting an action to condemn whatever interest C&G may have owned
in the land. However, it voluntarily chose not to do so." C & G, Inc., 139 Idaho at 146, 75 P.3d
at 200.
The Idaho Supreme Court has provided that the elements of equitable estoppel are: (I) a
false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of
the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3)
that the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and
(4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were
concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice. .L R. Sirnplot

v. Chemetics Intern., Inc., 126 Idaho 532, 534-35, 887 P.2d 1039, 1041-42 (1994), citing
Williams v. Blakley, 114 Idaho 323, 325, 757 P.2d 186, 188 (1987); Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp.
Bldg. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 22, 644 P.2d 341, 344 (1982). Estoppel does not "extend" a
statute of limitation. Rather, it prevents a party from pleading and utilizing the statute of
limitation as a bar, although the time limit of the statute may have already run. Id, citing Twin

Falls Clinic, 103 Idaho at 22, 644 P.2d at 344. "When dealing with a problem which arises
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d

under such diverse circu~nstancesprocedural rigidities should be avoided." C&

Inc. v. Canyon

Hwy Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho at 146, 75 P.3d.at 200, citing Dickinson v. U S , supra. Justice Pro
Tern Schwartzman, specially concurring.
In this case, the State knew there was a strong basis to contest its claim to the sand and
gravel. It hid these facts and persuaded Harris tl~oughthreats to not only submit to the State's
control, but also to make payments to the State, and to sign a document including a provision
which would, in the State's interpretation, totally exonerate the State from any and all claims
arising out the State's, if not deliberate, then careless, misapplication of the law.

The

uncontroverted evidence is that the Harris relied and acted solely upon the representations of
Ms. Johnson to their prejudi~e."~The State itself is responsible for its misperception regarding
its property interest, and the consequences which stem from its failure to proactively determine
its rights and standardize its policies and procedures. This Court should not permit the State to
benefit from its own lack of diligence. The State must be estopped to raise the defense that
Harris could have and should have brought this suit in 1986.

C.

The Statute of Limitations Should be Eauitablv Tolled.

Equitable tolling of I.C.

3

5-224 should also apply in this case.

'04

Equitable tolling

functions to stop the statute of limitations froin running where the claim's accrual date has
already passed. There are three principal, though not exclusive, situations in which equitable
tolling may be appropriate: (1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting
the plaintiffs cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been
lo'

104

R. Val. fV pp. 747-755.
This also was argued, as was equitable estoppel, to the Districl Court. R. Vol. V pp. 907-08; 91 3-915.
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prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her
rights mistakenly in the wrong forum. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein. Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d

1380, 1391-1392 (3d Cir. 1994). The fundamental rule of equity that a party should not be
permitted to profit from its own wrongdoing underlies the equitable tolling doctrine itself. See

Miklavic v. USAir Inc., 21 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1994). Idaho follows this principle. See, C &

G, Inc. at 144,75 P.3d at 198.

!

Where the government has "actively misled [the plaintiffl into forgoing prompt action to
vindicate its rights" the doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied. Accord, 287 Corporate

Ctr. Assocs. v. Township of Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320,324-325 (3d Cir. 1996). The undisputed
facts leave no question that Harris was actively misled into both submitting to the State's
demands and foregoing legal action.
V.

EARRIS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES.

Hams sought attorneys fees on the basis of I.C. §§ 12-117'05 and -121 and the Private

. their first Motion for Attorneys Fees before the District
Attorneys General Doctrine106 m
~ o u r t . 'Harris
~ ~ also requested fees under LC. $ 7-718.

lo8

The State has suggested that Harris

failed to move for fees under LC. § 12 -1 17.'09 In fact, that section was explicitly presented to
the District Court in oral argument on Harris's second motion for attorneys fees where the court
ruled on both the application of LC. $5 12- 117 and -121."'

lo'

R Vol. N at pp. 819 - 824.

Id. at at pp 824 - 25.
R. Vol. IV p. 801.
Io8 Attorneys fees were requested on this basis below. R. Vol. V, pp. 970-971.
'"~es~ondents'Brief at p. 28.
"O Appellants' Motion to Augment Reporter's Transcript, April 29,2008.Transcript of Motion for Attorneys Fees
and Costs at p. 20 and 23.
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Restricting its argument thus, to the grounds for attorneys fees under LC.

5 12-121, the

State relies on the District Court's understanding of the case to assert that it's counterclaim and
defense below, as well as in this appeal, are reasonable and not frivolous. The State justifies the
logic and merit of its actions in this lawsuit on the basis of its "simple" legal theory."' The State

I

expressly states that it has pursued this litigation because "once the Land Board realized in 1971
that it may not have ownership of the sand and gravel under LC. 47-701, it began changing the

1

deeds to land purchasers." It did this unilaterally, without notice to or negotiation with those

1

purchasers "to make sure the purchaser understood that those commodities were reserved, and
to "clear up any ambiguity in the term 'minerals' under I. C. 47- 701.,, I I2

1

l

But the State's explanation fails to give the whole picture. As both the facts of this case
and the facts of TVC demonstrate, in many, if not most instances, the deeds were issued many
years after the land was purchased. So, as in this case, when the deed was recorded by the State

(23 years after it was sold by the State), it was issued to the hews of the transferee of the original
purchaser.

"3

Therefore, this attempt to "clear up the law" and "put purchasers on notice" is, in

and of itself, unreasonable-particularly
j

in light of the facts of this case, where the disagreement

concerning whether the State owned the sand and gravel in the first place was already known,
and the State's own attorney had advised it as early as 1938 that the State did not own the sand
and gravel under the
One simply cannot avoid asking oneself, why the State used TIBS method to provide

'I'

1
i

'I2
'I3

'I4

Respondents' Brief at p. 30.
Respondents7Brief at p. 30.
See Appellants' Opening Brief at p. 3.
See Appellants' Opening Brief at pp 5-6.
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itself assurance of its ownership rights, when it had several opportunities to appeal lower court
decisions prior to 1984 holding against its ownership and Director Hamilton had already

-

acknowledged that a declaratory judgment action was the appropriate vehicle to resolve the
State's on-going questions. It is also inexplicable why the State formally acknowledged that
Harris was the owner of the sand and gravel and was entitled to a rehnd of royalties paid to the
State in 1999,'15 but then,

the Treamre Valley decision and after the Land Board's 2003

directive to the Department that the state settle all disputes in favor of the

ando owner,"^ the

State initiated a counterclaim and defense against Harris based on sand and gravel ownership. It
strains the imagination that the State would go to such extremes in a situation where it has
admitted that the whole affair

is the result of its own incon~istent,"~muddled,118 and

in~oherent"~
policies and land sale documentation practices
Furthermore, the State itself cites many times to TVC and asks this Court to consider the
merits of its case after "reviewing the entire course of litigation".12' As demonstrated herein,
however, the reasonableness of the State's position in light of all of its representations and
conduct over the course of this case and TVC is discredited. Moreover, the same attomeys who
advised the State to take the action it did (and who also advised them not to take the action they
took), are the attorneys who brought the counterclaim for title and who are defending this appeal
(Attorney Generals Office). Therefore, only private litigants could be expected to bring this suit.
Anyone dealing with a state agency stands to benefit from a decision which holds such agencies
%15

See footnotes 21 and 22 above.

"'R Vol. IV pp. 632-33,639-42.
"'R. Vol. Ipp. 183-84, 187-88.
lX8

'I9

Appellants' Reply in TVC at p. 13 (see footnote 1)
Id. at 20
Respondents' Brief at pp. 30 and 31.
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I
I

I

accountable for their consistent, diligent, comprehensive adherence to standards of sovereign
accountability; i.e. uniform application of Land Board policy decisions; adherence to the State's
attorney's advice, careful and uniform documentation of state transactions documents;

I

application of principles of fairness and equity.
Additionally, in light of Harris's claim for damages under the inverse condemnation laws,

I

Harris may be awarded attorneys' fees as the condemnee without a showing and finding that the

1

action was brought and pursued "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Ada County

I

Highway Dist. v. Acarrequz, 105 Idaho 873,875-77,673 P.2d 1067,1069-71 (1983). In that case,

as well, the Supreme Court rejected the Highway District's proposed standard that attorney's
fees can not be considered by the trial court in an assessment of whether the equities of a given
case require the inclusion of attorneys fees as part of "just compensation". The court noted that
such a rule was far too rigid because circumstances, such as those of the present case, could arise
where treating fees as another element of damages would be amply justified by the equities of
the situation. Here, the State is a victim of its own device. The District Court has already found
that Harris prevailed on the issue of ownership, yet it did not award attorneys fees to
The equities of this case demand that the Harrises be granted the full value of the property taken
by inverse condemnation, plus attorneys fees.
Finally, the State relies heavily throughout its brief on the District Court's various (and
conflicting) opinions concerning the application of TVC to this case to assert the reasonableness
of its case. However, the district court's own statements reflect that his decisions may not have
been applied within the legal principles applicable to the case or within the boundaries of the
IZ1

Appellants' Motion to Augment Reporter's Transcript dated April 29,2008, Transcript, p. 22

APPELLANTS' REPLY BREZ - 42

I

I

judge's discretion. Ackerman v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 307,92 P.3d 557 (Ct. App. 2004)
to both the law and facts of this case.
Early in this lawsuit, after ruling from the bench and then reconsidering that ruling, the

I

~

I

court stated, "I don't get paid to be right, I get paid to decide cases"; and, finding this case to be a
difficult case (again, at the very earliest stages) he added: "[hlard cases make bad law and I'm

I

prepared to make dot of bad law in this case." With respect to the fact that he had already
I

I

"decided this one both ways" in three different rulings on only the first set of motions for

II

summary judgment, the court commented " I feel that [sic] chagrined that I can't or to this point
haven't been consistent in my application of the law to the facts."'22
Later in the lawsuit, the judge explained his approach to deciding this case: "I guess, I
think this case is going up, so what I'm going to try to do is posture it to a point where I think a

I

reviewing court can look at the things that I have done and say he was right here, he was wrong

i
1

here, but he has made a record on all of these various issues and we now can send it back to him

I

without the necessity of going back to him without guidance ....[O]ne of my

biggest

complaints... is when I make a decision and it goes up and then it comes back to me without
sufficient information for me to say, how do I now decide this case?r,

123

Subsequently, the district court postulated with counsel "ways in which matters can be
resolved expeditiously" and suggested that it would be judicially economical to grant sum~nary
1

judgment for the State and then "we wouldn't have to go to trial." Harris's counsel urged the
district court to rule based on the law and leave the determination of whether the rulings were

!

1

8

,

:

j

122

TR. p. 97, lines 17-20; p. 78, lines 18-25.
lines 22-25 and p. 92, lines 1-9.

lZ3Id. at p. 91
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right or wrong to the appellate court.'24The following exchange then occurred:

Ms. Denton: I think we need a determination and I think you need to
rule with what you think the law says. And we'll deal with what the
Supreme Court says when it says it.
The Court: I guess if I though the law was clear I'd be more confident
than that."
Ms. Denton: Well, I think they've made it pretty clear they don't want to
give advisoly opinions.
The Court: You're right on the mark there. Even when it's absolutely
helpful. '25...
Ms. Denton: . .. I don't think it makes sense to rule in a way that simply
allows all of us to go up today ...regardless of what the merits or the law
is, that's what I'm saying. I think the Judge need to rule, he needs to
decide whether there is damages or isn't and we need to appeal. Who is
going to appeal,... and if we all come back and do it again, then so he it.
But hopefully whatever Judge Stegner says is right and we're all done.
Mr. Becker: Agreed.
The Court: you have a higher degree of confidence in this case than I do.
Some five years and several rulings and self-reversals laterIz6,the district court again
voiced its thoughts about deciding the case in a way that would force the issues to the appellate
court in the shortest time possible so that direction could be given on how to hy the case. 'My
fear is that, at least one of my fears, is that the posture of this case is such that almost regardless
of what I do, unless I grant summary judgment in favor of the State and allow that to be taken up,
is to not get any guidance from our Supreme Court as to how this case will be tried ultimately
until after its been tried once."'27 Hence, the court's rulings do not appear to he soundly based in
appropriate determinations of fact or of the law but rather on "posturing" this case to obtain

lZ4

1d at p. 148 -150.

"'TR at p. 150, lines 13-22.
lZ6 See, for example, Transcript of Telephonic Proceedings at p. 29 lines 24 and 25 where the judge granted
summary judgment to the State; then p. 44, lines 22 and 23 where the district judge reversed his prior ruling in favor
of the State; and again at p. 80, lines 5-1 1 where the judge indicated he was prepared to reverse himself yet again
but did not.
'"Id at p. 148, lines 1-5.
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guidance for what the court perceived to be the eventuality of a trial for damages. Therefore, the

I

I

1

State's reliance on the district court for proof of the reasonableness of the State's case is not well
placed.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The proper outcome of this case is to reverse the District Court on its rulings concerning
Hanis's claim for inverse condemnation and, in accordance with the Idaho and United States
I

Constitutions, award liquidated damages on that portion of the damages which are ascertainable

I

at this point,'28plus pre-judgment and compounded interestlZ9on that amount to account for lost
I

investment opportunity (See PetPo, 47 Fed. C1. at 152); and attorneys fees, either as part of the
I

I

judgment in inverse condemnation to provide for "111 compensation" or based on reversal of the
district court's decision on attorneys fees, and award Harris both fees below and on appeal. The
only issue left to resolve by jury trial will then be the fair rental value of the remaining Forty
Acres over which the State took control and to which Hanis is entitled to compensation.
Not only will such a resolution compensate Hanis for the loss of his property, but it will
also send a clear message to the Department and State to take heed when issues, departmental
disputes, and procedural problems arise internally. It will put state agencies on notice that hiding
behind paperwork, bullying citizens, avoiding the courts and legislature, ignoring their attorneys
advice, and delaying remedial steps hoping for a lapse of the citizen's procedural rights, may not
bode well for them in the end.

I& pp. 557 and 578-580.
Compounded interest has already been the subject of debate and uncertainty. See TR.186-190

lZ8R. Vol.
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